Thanks for helpful comments and conversation to Fiona Cowie, Steve Stich, Anjan Chakravartty, Peter Carruthers and J. D. Trout, as well as two anonymous referees.
On Fodor’s Analogy: Why Psychology is Like Philosophy of Science After All
Article first published online: 30 OCT 2006
2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 21, Issue 5, pages 553–564, November 2006
How to Cite
MURPHY, D. (2006), On Fodor’s Analogy: Why Psychology is Like Philosophy of Science After All. Mind & Language, 21: 553–564. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00291.x
- Issue published online: 30 OCT 2006
- Article first published online: 30 OCT 2006
Abstract: Jerry Fodor has argued that a modular mind must include central systems responsible for updating beliefs, and has defended this position by appealing to shared properties of belief fixation and scientific confirmation. Peter Carruthers and Stephen Pinker have attacked this analogy between science and ordinary inference. I examine their arguments and show that they fail. This does not show that Fodor’s more general position is correct.