I would like to thank Joshua Knobe, Hugh McCann, Al Mele, Eddy Nahmias, Virginia Tice, the editor of Mind & Language, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
On Trying to Save the Simple View
Version of Record online: 30 OCT 2006
2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 21, Issue 5, pages 565–586, November 2006
How to Cite
NADELHOFFER, T. (2006), On Trying to Save the Simple View. Mind & Language, 21: 565–586. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00292.x
- Issue online: 30 OCT 2006
- Version of Record online: 30 OCT 2006
Abstract: According to the analysis of intentional action that Michael Bratman has dubbed the ‘Simple View’, intending to x is necessary for intentionally x-ing. Despite the plausibility of this view, there is gathering empirical evidence that when people are presented with cases involving moral considerations, they are much more likely to judge that the action (or side effect) in question was brought about intentionally than they are to judge that the agent intended to do it. This suggests that at least as far as the ordinary concept of intentional action is concerned, an agent need not intend to x in order to x intentionally.