An early version of this paper was presented at the 2007 Mind & Language conference on pretense and imagination and at Mimesis, Metaphysics, and Make-Believe, a conference in honor of Ken Walton. A later version was presented at the 2008 Conference on Imagination, at Temple University. I’m grateful to the audiences and other colleagues for suggestions, especially Noel Carroll, Emma Cohen, Tim Crane, Greg Currie, Stacie Friend, Tamar Gendler, Samuel Guttenplan, Paul Harris, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Aaron Meskin, Bill Seeley, Deena Skolnik-Weisberg, Kathleen Stock, Ken Walton, Jonathan Weinberg, and Stephen Yablo. I’m also indebted to Claire Cooper, Marga Reimer, and Philip Robbins for extremely helpful comments on this material.
Imagination and the I
Article first published online: 13 OCT 2008
© 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 23, Issue 5, pages 518–535, November 2008
How to Cite
NICHOLS, S. (2008), Imagination and the I. Mind & Language, 23: 518–535. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00356.x
- Issue published online: 13 OCT 2008
- Article first published online: 13 OCT 2008
Abstract: Thought experiments about the self seem to lead to deeply conflicting intuitions about the self. Cases imagined from the 3rd person perspective seem to provoke different responses than cases imagined from the 1st person perspective. This paper argues that recent cognitive theories of the imagination, coupled with standard views about indexical concepts, help explain our reactions in the 1st person cases. The explanation helps identify intuitions that should not be trusted as a guide to the metaphysics of the self.