Thanks to Pierre Jacob and Frédérique de Vignemont for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading
Article first published online: 30 MAR 2009
© 2009 The Author Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 24, Issue 2, pages 235–252, April 2009
How to Cite
GOLDMAN, A. I. (2009), Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading. Mind & Language, 24: 235–252. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01361.x
- Issue published online: 30 MAR 2009
- Article first published online: 30 MAR 2009
Abstract: Pierre Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or imagination). Jacob implies that bi-level simulationism creates an unbridgeable ‘gap’ in intention reading, but this is not a compelling challenge.