I owe many thanks to Eric Margolis, Michael Roche, Larry Shapiro, and Alan Sidelle for their helpful comments and friendly support.
Embodied Cognition and Mindreading
Article first published online: 18 JAN 2010
© 2010 The Author. Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 25, Issue 1, pages 119–140, February 2010
How to Cite
SPAULDING, S. (2010), Embodied Cognition and Mindreading. Mind & Language, 25: 119–140. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01383.x
- Issue published online: 18 JAN 2010
- Article first published online: 18 JAN 2010
Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied cognition arguments and argue that mindreading approaches can withstand the best of these arguments from embodied cognition.