We are grateful to two anonymous referees for useful suggestions and comments on an earlier version of this article and to the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature at the University of Oslo for supporting our work.
Version of Record online: 20 AUG 2010
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 25, Issue 4, pages 359–393, September 2010
How to Cite
SPERBER, D., CLÉMENT, F., HEINTZ, C., MASCARO, O., MERCIER, H., ORIGGI, G. and WILSON, D. (2010), Epistemic Vigilance. Mind & Language, 25: 359–393. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01394.x
- Issue online: 20 AUG 2010
- Version of Record online: 20 AUG 2010
Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology and the social sciences.