This symposium is based on a workshop organized on Doing without Concepts by the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh in March 2009. I am grateful to John Norton for organizing this symposium, to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz for participating in this symposium, and to the audience for useful questions and comments. Finally, I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for her comments.
Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz
Article first published online: 18 OCT 2010
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 25, Issue 5, pages 634–646, November 2010
How to Cite
MACHERY, E. (2010), Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz. Mind & Language, 25: 634–646. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01406.x
- Issue published online: 18 OCT 2010
- Article first published online: 18 OCT 2010
In this response to Malt's and Prinz's commentaries, I argue that neo-empiricist hypotheses fail to threaten the argument for the elimination of ‘concept’ because they are unlikely to be true of all concepts, if they are true at all. I also defend the hypothesis that we possess bodies of knowledge retrieved by default from long-term memory, and I argue that prototypes, exemplars, and theories form genuinely distinct concepts.