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Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz

Authors


  • This symposium is based on a workshop organized on Doing without Concepts by the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh in March 2009. I am grateful to John Norton for organizing this symposium, to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz for participating in this symposium, and to the audience for useful questions and comments. Finally, I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for her comments.

Edouard Machery, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017CL, Pittsburgh PA 15260, USA.
Email:machery@pitt.edu

Abstract

In this response to Malt's and Prinz's commentaries, I argue that neo-empiricist hypotheses fail to threaten the argument for the elimination of ‘concept’ because they are unlikely to be true of all concepts, if they are true at all. I also defend the hypothesis that we possess bodies of knowledge retrieved by default from long-term memory, and I argue that prototypes, exemplars, and theories form genuinely distinct concepts.

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