I am indebted to very helpful discussion at a Kline workshop on experimental philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, 23-24 April 2010, and to David Braddon-Mitchell, Simon Cullen and Michael Smith.
On Gettier Holdouts
Version of Record online: 6 SEP 2011
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 26, Issue 4, pages 468–481, September 2011
How to Cite
JACKSON, F. (2011), On Gettier Holdouts. Mind & Language, 26: 468–481. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01427.x
- Issue online: 6 SEP 2011
- Version of Record online: 6 SEP 2011
How should we react to the contention that there is empirical evidence showing that many judge Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge, contrary to the verdict of most analytical philosophers about these cases? I argue that there is no single answer to this question. The discussion is set inside a view about how to view the role and significance of intuitive responses to some of philosophy's famous thought experiments. One take-home message is that experimental philosophy and conceptual analysis are not as far apart as is often thought.