An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in Bloomington, IN (June 2009). I am grateful to the audience, and especially to Kristin Andrews, my commentator on that occasion, for helpful comments. The paper was expanded during a Junior Faculty Leave granted by Colgate University. Eric Schwitzgebel offered insightful comments on a draft. Finally, I am grateful to two anonymous referees at Mind & Language for their valuable suggestions.
Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief
Article first published online: 3 NOV 2011
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Mind & Language
Volume 26, Issue 5, pages 596–628, November 2011
How to Cite
TUMULTY, M. (2011), Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief. Mind & Language, 26: 596–628. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01432.x
- Issue published online: 3 NOV 2011
- Article first published online: 3 NOV 2011
The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do competing accounts of belief.