Metacognition and Endorsement

Authors


  • Thanks for comments to Jérôme Dokic, Conor McHugh, Joëlle Proust, the members of the metacognition reading group at the Institut Jean-Nicod, audiences at the Justification Revisited conference at the Université de Genève, the 2010 Aristotelian Society/Mind joint sessions at University College Dublin, the 2010 Société Française de Psychologie at the Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille 3, and the University of Edinburgh, and two anonymous referees. My understanding of the epistemology of metacognition has e enefited greatly from reading unpublished work by Jennifer Nagel and Chris Lepock. The preparation of this article was supported in part by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche, under the contract ANR-08.BLAN-0205-01.

Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, Ankara 06800, Turkey.
Email:kmichaelian@bilkent.edu.tr

Abstract

Real agents rely, when forming their beliefs, on imperfect informational sources (sources which deliver, even under normal conditions of operation, both accurate and inaccurate information). They therefore face the ‘endorsement problem’: how can beliefs produced by endorsing information received from imperfect sources be formed in an epistemically acceptable manner? Focussing on the case of episodic memory and drawing on empirical work on metamemory, this article argues that metacognition likely plays a crucial role in explaining how agents solve the endorsement problem.

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