Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall
Version of Record online: 20 AUG 2007
Volume 41, Issue 3, pages 394–428, September 2007
How to Cite
Haybron, D. M. (2007), Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall. Noûs, 41: 394–428. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00653.x
- Issue online: 20 AUG 2007
- Version of Record online: 20 AUG 2007
This paper aims to show that widespread, serious errors in the self-assessment of affect are a genuine possibility—one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or “affective ignorance.” For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. I note several implications of these arguments. First, we may be less competent pursuers of happiness than is commonly believed, raising difficult questions for political thought. Second, some of the errors discussed ramify for our understanding of consciousness, including Ned Block's controversial distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Third, empirical results based on self-reports about affect may be systematically misleading in certain ways.