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Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge
Article first published online: 18 JUN 2010
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00757.x
© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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How to Cite
Roca-Royes, S. (2011), Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge. Noûs, 45: 22–49. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00757.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 21 FEB 2011
- Article first published online: 18 JUN 2010
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Abstract
The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.