Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge
Version of Record online: 18 JUN 2010
© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Volume 45, Issue 1, pages 22–49, March 2011
How to Cite
Roca-Royes, S. (2011), Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge. Noûs, 45: 22–49. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00757.x
- Issue online: 21 FEB 2011
- Version of Record online: 18 JUN 2010
The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.