Undermining Motivations for Universalism
Article first published online: 20 JAN 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00779.x
© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Additional Information
How to Cite
Effingham, N. (2011), Undermining Motivations for Universalism. Noûs, 45: 696–713. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00779.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 16 NOV 2011
- Article first published online: 20 JAN 2011
- Abstract
- Article
- References
- Cited By
Abstract
Universalism (the thesis that for any ys, those ys compose a further object) is an answer to the Special Composition Question. In the literature there are three arguments – what I call the arguments from elegance – that universalists often rely upon, but which are rarely examined in-depth. I argue that these motivations cannot be had by the perdurantist, for to avoid a commitment to badly behaved superluminal objects perdurantists must answer the ‘Proper Continuant Question’. Any answer to that question necessarily ensures that there is a restricted answer to the Special Composition Question that is just as elegant as universalism. Thus, if you are a perdurantist, the arguments from elegance fail to motivate universalism for there will always be a restricted composition that is just as good.

1468-0068/asset/NOUS_left.gif?v=1&s=4273ae2e27e360d0f6388535089039e91a80c7ef)
