Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction
Article first published online: 20 JAN 2011
© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Volume 46, Issue 2, pages 289–325, June 2012
How to Cite
Choi, S. (2012), Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction. Noûs, 46: 289–325. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00789.x
- Issue published online: 17 MAY 2012
- Article first published online: 20 JAN 2011
The central theme of this paper is the dispositional/categorical distinction that has been one of the top agendas in contemporary metaphysics. I will first develop from my semantic account of dispositions what I think the correct formulation of the dispositional/categorical distinction in terms of counterfactual conditionals. It will be argued that my formulation does not have the shortcomings that have plagued previously proposed ones. Then I will turn my attention to one of its consequences, the thesis that dispositional properties are not susceptible to intrinsic finks. This thesis was first advanced by me and has ever since stirred up a big controversy, endorsed by some philosophers like Handfield, Bird, and Cohen but rejected by others like Clarke and Fara. Against this background, I will remedy my defense of the impossibility of intrinsically finkable dispositions and then refute some of apparently powerful criticisms of it. And so the upshot is that it is much more reasonable to hold on to the thesis that dispositions are intrinsically unfinkable. This will have the effect of putting the dispositional/categorical distinction on firmer and more secure ground.