Perceptual Content Defended
Version of Record online: 20 JAN 2011
© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Volume 45, Issue 4, pages 714–750, December 2011
How to Cite
Schellenberg, S. (2011), Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs, 45: 714–750. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00791.x
- Issue online: 16 NOV 2011
- Version of Record online: 20 JAN 2011
Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational.