Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety
Version of Record online: 21 FEB 2011
© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Volume 45, Issue 1, pages 77–102, March 2011
How to Cite
Kennedy, M. (2011), Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs, 45: 77–102. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00805.x
- Issue online: 21 FEB 2011
- Version of Record online: 21 FEB 2011
Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.