Rationalism and Necessitarianism
Version of Record online: 19 OCT 2011
© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Volume 46, Issue 3, pages 418–448, September 2012
How to Cite
Lin, M. (2012), Rationalism and Necessitarianism. Noûs, 46: 418–448. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00832.x
- Issue online: 8 AUG 2012
- Version of Record online: 19 OCT 2011
Metaphysical rationalism, the doctrine which affirms the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR), is out of favor today. The best argument against it is that it appears to lead to necessitarianism, the claim that all truths are necessarily true. Whatever the intuitive appeal of the PSR, the intuitive appeal of the claim that things could have been otherwise is greater. This problem did not go unnoticed by the great metaphysical rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz. Spinoza’s response was to embrace necessitarianism. Leibniz’s response was to argue that, despite appearances, rationalism does not lead to necessitarianism. This paper examines the debate between these two rationalists and concludes that Leibniz has persuasive grounds for his opinion. This has significant implications both for the plausibility of the PSR and for our understanding of modality.