I would like to thank Anna Risch for her invaluable help in managing the dataset. I also thank Stephen Bazen and everyone who took part in the Careers in Academia research project for their helpful comments, in particular Christine Musselin and Frédérique Pigeyre. The Ministry of Higher Education (Bureau Etudes Prévionnelles – DGRH-A1) is acknowledged for giving access to data. This research was funded by the National Research Agency (ANR – TRAJUNI Project).
Does Productivity Decline After Promotion? The Case of French Academia*
Article first published online: 2 JAN 2012
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Department of Economics, University of Oxford, 2012
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
Volume 74, Issue 6, pages 886–902, December 2012
How to Cite
Sabatier, M. (2012), Does Productivity Decline After Promotion? The Case of French Academia. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 74: 886–902. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0084.2011.00681.x
- Issue published online: 26 OCT 2012
- Article first published online: 2 JAN 2012
- Final Manuscript Received: July 2011
The present research examined the effect of promotion decisions on ex-post productivity in French academia. As, once promotion decisions are known, most external incentives vanish for promoted candidates, their productivity was expected to decrease. This hypothesis was tested by using an original dataset and matching methods to evaluate the impact of promotion on publication scores. The robustness of the matching estimates was tested using sensitivity analysis. The results clearly show that the removal of extrinsic incentives following promotion does not lead to a fall in productivity in French academia.