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CAN RATIONALIST ABDUCTIVISM SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION?
Article first published online: 25 MAY 2008
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00314.x
© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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How to Cite
BEEBE, J. R. (2008), CAN RATIONALIST ABDUCTIVISM SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION?. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89: 151–168. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00314.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 25 MAY 2008
- Article first published online: 25 MAY 2008
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Abstract: According to Laurence BonJour, the problem of induction can be solved by recognizing the a priori necessity that inductive conclusions constitute the best explanations of inductive premises. I defend an interpretation of the key probability claims BonJour makes about inductive premises and show that they are not susceptible to many of the objections that have been lodged against them. I then argue that these purportedly necessary probability claims nevertheless remain deeply problematic and that, as a result, BonJour's proposal fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the problem of induction.