BLAME AND RESPONSIVENESS TO MORAL REASONS: ARE PSYCHOPATHS BLAMEWORTHY?
Article first published online: 28 NOV 2008
© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 89, Issue 4, pages 516–535, December 2008
How to Cite
TALBERT, M. (2008), BLAME AND RESPONSIVENESS TO MORAL REASONS: ARE PSYCHOPATHS BLAMEWORTHY?. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89: 516–535. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00334.x
- Issue published online: 28 NOV 2008
- Article first published online: 28 NOV 2008
Abstract: Many philosophers believe that people who are not capable of grasping the significance of moral considerations are not open to moral blame when they fail to respond appropriately to these considerations. I contend, however, that some morally blind, or ‘psychopathic,’ agents are proper targets for moral blame, at least on some occasions. I argue that moral blame is a response to the normative commitments and attitudes of a wrongdoer and that the actions of morally blind agents can express the relevant blame-grounding attitudes insofar as these agents possess the capacity to make judgments about non-moral reasons.