Version of Record online: 11 NOV 2009
© 2009 The Author. Journal compilation © 2009 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 90, Issue 4, pages 482–502, December 2009
How to Cite
LEDDINGTON, J. (2009), PERCEPTUAL PRESENCE. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90: 482–502. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01351.x
- Issue online: 11 NOV 2009
- Version of Record online: 11 NOV 2009
Plausibly, any adequate theory of perception must (a) solve what Alva Noë calls ‘the problem of perceptual presence,’ and (b) do justice to the direct realist idea that what is given in perception are garden-variety spatiotemporal particulars. This paper shows that, while Noë's sensorimotor view arguably satisfies the first of these conditions, it does not satisfy the second. Moreover, Noë is wrong to think that a naïve realist approach to perception cannot handle the problem of perceptual presence. Section three of this paper develops a version of naïve realism that meets both of the adequacy conditions above. This paper thus provides strong considerations in favor of naïve realism.