EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT, RELIABILITY, AND HUME'S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
Article first published online: 11 NOV 2009
© 2009 The Author. Journal compilation © 2009 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 90, Issue 4, pages 503–519, December 2009
How to Cite
TUCKER, C. (2009), EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT, RELIABILITY, AND HUME'S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90: 503–519. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01352.x
- Issue published online: 11 NOV 2009
- Article first published online: 11 NOV 2009
Necessity holds that, if a proposition A supports another B, then it must support B. John Greco contends that one can resolve Hume's Problem of Induction only if she rejects Necessity in favor of reliabilism. If Greco's contention is correct, we would have good reason to reject Necessity and endorse reliabilism about inferential justification. Unfortunately, Greco's contention is mistaken. I argue that there is a plausible reply to Hume's Problem that both endorses Necessity and is at least as good as Greco's alternative. Hence, Greco provides a good reason for neither rejecting Necessity nor endorsing inferential reliabilism.