THE DESIRES OF OTHERS
Version of Record online: 1 SEP 2010
© 2010 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2010 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 91, Issue 3, pages 385–400, September 2010
How to Cite
MARUŠIĆ, B. (2010), THE DESIRES OF OTHERS. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91: 385–400. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01373.x
- Issue online: 1 SEP 2010
- Version of Record online: 1 SEP 2010
An influential view, defended by Thomas Scanlon and others, holds that desires are almost never reasons. I seek to resist this view and show that someone who desires something does thereby have a reason to satisfy her desire. To show this, I argue, first, that the desires of some others are reasons for us and, second, that our own desires are no less reason-giving than those of others. In concluding, I emphasize that accepting my view does not commit one to a desire-based account of reasons. Desires can be simply one kind of reasons alongside many others.