TWO KINDS OF INTENTIONALITY IN LOCKE
Version of Record online: 1 DEC 2010
© 2010 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2010 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 91, Issue 4, pages 554–586, December 2010
How to Cite
SHAPIRO, L. (2010), TWO KINDS OF INTENTIONALITY IN LOCKE. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91: 554–586. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01375.x
- Issue online: 1 DEC 2010
- Version of Record online: 1 DEC 2010
Ideas play at least two roles in Locke's theory of the understanding. They are constituents of ‘propositions,’ and some of them ‘represent’ the qualities and sorts of surrounding bodies. I argue that each role involves a distinct kind of intentional directedness. The same idea will in general be an ‘idea of’ two different objects, in different senses of the expression. Identifying Locke's scheme of twofold ‘ofness’ reveals a common structure to his accounts of simple ideas and complex ideas of substances. A consequence is a distinction among substance sorts parallel to one of his distinctions between primary and secondary qualities.