HAVING KNOW-HOW: INTELLECT, ACTION, AND RECENT WORK ON RYLE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE-HOW AND KNOWLEDGE-THAT
Version of Record online: 1 DEC 2010
© 2010 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2010 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 91, Issue 4, pages 507–530, December 2010
How to Cite
SAX, G. (2010), HAVING KNOW-HOW: INTELLECT, ACTION, AND RECENT WORK ON RYLE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE-HOW AND KNOWLEDGE-THAT. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91: 507–530. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01376.x
- Issue online: 1 DEC 2010
- Version of Record online: 1 DEC 2010
Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing-how/knowing-that distinction charging that it obstructs our understanding of human action. Incorrectly interpreting the distinction to imply that knowledge-how is non-propositional, they object that Ryle's argument for it is unsound and linguistic theory contradicts it. I show that they (and their interlocutors) misconstrue the distinction and Ryle's argument. Consequently, their objections fail. On my reading, Ryle's distinction pertains to, not knowledge, but an explanatory gap between explicit and implicit content, and his argument for it is sound. I defend the distinction's necessity in explaining human action and show that it propels a fruitful explanatory program.