ESSENTIALIST ARGUMENTS AGAINST DESCRIPTIVISM
Version of Record online: 1 DEC 2010
© 2010 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2010 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 91, Issue 4, pages 443–462, December 2010
How to Cite
MCGLONE, M. (2010), ESSENTIALIST ARGUMENTS AGAINST DESCRIPTIVISM. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91: 443–462. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01377.x
- Issue online: 1 DEC 2010
- Version of Record online: 1 DEC 2010
This paper considers Kripke's (1972, 1980) modal arguments against descriptivism about proper names, the descriptivist reply that the meaning of a name is given by a description involving the modifier ‘actually’, and Kit Fine's (1994) distinction between necessary and essential attributes. It explains how Kripke's modal arguments can be recast in essentialist terms by appealing to Fine's distinction, and it argues that the resulting essentialist arguments are immune to the abovementioned descriptivist reply to the original modal arguments.