THE INADEQUACY OF PARAPHRASE IS THE DOGMA OF METAPHOR
Version of Record online: 1 DEC 2010
© 2010 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2010 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 91, Issue 4, pages 481–506, December 2010
How to Cite
PHELAN, M. (2010), THE INADEQUACY OF PARAPHRASE IS THE DOGMA OF METAPHOR. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91: 481–506. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01378.x
- Issue online: 1 DEC 2010
- Version of Record online: 1 DEC 2010
Philosophers have alleged that paraphrases of metaphors are inadequate. They have presented this inadequacy as a datum predicted by, and thus a reason to accept, particular accounts of ‘metaphorical meanings.’ But to what, specifically, does this inadequacy claim amount? I argue that, if this assumption is to have any bearing on the metaphor debate, it must be construed as the comparative claim that paraphrases of metaphors are inadequate compared to paraphrases of literal utterances. But the evidence philosophers have offered does not support the comparative inadequacy of paraphrases of metaphors. I offer my own empirical evidence against the inadequacy assumption.