MENTAL IMAGERY AND THE VARIETIES OF AMODAL PERCEPTION
Version of Record online: 11 MAY 2011
© 2011 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 92, Issue 2, pages 153–173, June 2011
How to Cite
BRISCOE, R. E. (2011), MENTAL IMAGERY AND THE VARIETIES OF AMODAL PERCEPTION. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92: 153–173. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01393.x
- Issue online: 11 MAY 2011
- Version of Record online: 11 MAY 2011
The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, but also by genuinely visual representations as well as beliefs. I conclude with some brief remarks on the role of object-directed bodily action in conferring a sense of unseen presence on an object's occluded features.