STOIC DISAGREEMENT AND BELIEF RETENTION
Article first published online: 11 MAY 2011
© 2011 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 92, Issue 2, pages 243–262, June 2011
How to Cite
RIEPPEL, M. (2011), STOIC DISAGREEMENT AND BELIEF RETENTION. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92: 243–262. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01396.x
- Issue published online: 11 MAY 2011
- Article first published online: 11 MAY 2011
Propositions are generally thought to have a truth-value only relative to some parameter or sequence of parameters. Many apparently straightforward notions, like what it is to disagree or retain a belief, become harder to explain once propositional truth is thus relativized. An account of disagreement within a framework involving such ‘stoic’ propositions is here presented. Some resources developed in that account are then used to respond to the eternalist charge that temporalist propositions can't function as belief contents because they don't allow us to make adequate sense of what belief retention amounts to.