WHEN DOES FALSEHOOD PRECLUDE KNOWLEDGE?
Version of Record online: 4 AUG 2011
© 2011 The AuthorsPacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 92, Issue 3, pages 283–304, September 2011
How to Cite
FEIT, N. and CULLISON, A. (2011), WHEN DOES FALSEHOOD PRECLUDE KNOWLEDGE?. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92: 283–304. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01397.x
- Issue online: 4 AUG 2011
- Version of Record online: 4 AUG 2011
Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem and arrive at a relatively simple theory with virtues linked to several issues at the heart of contemporary epistemology.