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WHEN DOES FALSEHOOD PRECLUDE KNOWLEDGE?
Article first published online: 4 AUG 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01397.x
© 2011 The AuthorsPacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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How to Cite
FEIT, N. and CULLISON, A. (2011), WHEN DOES FALSEHOOD PRECLUDE KNOWLEDGE?. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92: 283–304. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01397.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 4 AUG 2011
- Article first published online: 4 AUG 2011
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Abstract
Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem and arrive at a relatively simple theory with virtues linked to several issues at the heart of contemporary epistemology.