PERSPECTIVE-NEUTRAL INTRINSIC VALUE
Version of Record online: 4 AUG 2011
© 2011 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 92, Issue 3, pages 323–337, September 2011
How to Cite
KLOCKSIEM, J. (2011), PERSPECTIVE-NEUTRAL INTRINSIC VALUE. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92: 323–337. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01399.x
- Issue online: 4 AUG 2011
- Version of Record online: 4 AUG 2011
Is it possible to do a good thing, or to make the world a better place? Some argue that it is not possible, because perspective-neutral value does not exist. Some argue that ‘good’ does not play the right grammatical role; or that all good things are good ‘in a way’; or that goodness is inherently perspective-dependent. I argue that the logical and semantic properties of ‘good’ are what we should expect of an evaluative predicate; that the many ways of being good don't threaten the thesis that some ways are perspective-independent; and that there are clear examples of perspective-independent goodness.