UNREFLECTIVE ACTION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM SPEED
Version of Record online: 4 AUG 2011
© 2011 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 92, Issue 3, pages 338–362, September 2011
How to Cite
GOTTLIEB, G. (2011), UNREFLECTIVE ACTION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM SPEED. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92: 338–362. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01400.x
- Issue online: 4 AUG 2011
- Version of Record online: 4 AUG 2011
Hubert Dreyfus has defended a novel view of agency, most notably in his debate with John McDowell. Dreyfus argues that expert actions are primarily unreflective and do not involve conceptual activity. In unreflective action, embodied know-how plays the role reflection and conceptuality play in the actions of novices. Dreyfus employs two arguments to support his conclusion: the argument from speed and the phenomenological argument. I argue that Dreyfus's argumentative strategies are not successful, since he relies on a dubious assumption about concepts and reflection. I suggest that Dreyfus is committed to a minimal view of conceptuality in action.