DISENABLING LEVY'S FRANKFURT-STYLE ENABLING CASES
Article first published online: 4 AUG 2011
© 2011 The Authors. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 92, Issue 3, pages 400–414, September 2011
How to Cite
HAJI, I. and MCKENNA, M. (2011), DISENABLING LEVY'S FRANKFURT-STYLE ENABLING CASES. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92: 400–414. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01403.x
- Issue published online: 4 AUG 2011
- Article first published online: 4 AUG 2011
Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom-relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt-style examples are not cogent. In this paper, we explain why his argument fails.