ILLOCUTION, SILENCING AND THE ACT OF REFUSAL
Version of Record online: 4 AUG 2011
© 2011 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 92, Issue 3, pages 415–437, September 2011
How to Cite
MIKKOLA, M. (2011), ILLOCUTION, SILENCING AND THE ACT OF REFUSAL. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92: 415–437. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01404.x
- Issue online: 4 AUG 2011
- Version of Record online: 4 AUG 2011
Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby argue that there may be a free-speech argument against pornography, if pornographic speech has the power to illocutionarily silence women: women's locution ‘No!’ that aims to refuse unwanted sex may misfire because pornography creates communicative conditions where the locution does not count as a refusal. Central to this is the view that women's speech lacks uptake, which is necessary for illocutionary acts like that of refusal. Alexander Bird has critiqued this view by arguing that uptake is not necessary for the illocutionary act of refusal. The Hornsby-Langton view, then, is philosophically indefensible. Here I defend the philosophical cogency of the Hornsby-Langton approach.