APTNESS OF EMOTIONS FOR FICTIONS AND IMAGININGS
Article first published online: 2 NOV 2011
© 2011 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 92, Issue 4, pages 468–489, December 2011
How to Cite
GILMORE, J. (2011), APTNESS OF EMOTIONS FOR FICTIONS AND IMAGININGS. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92: 468–489. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01407.x
- Issue published online: 2 NOV 2011
- Article first published online: 2 NOV 2011
Many philosophical accounts of the emotions conceive of them as susceptible to assessments of rationality, fittingness, or some other notion of aptness. Analogous assumptions apply in cases of emotions directed at what are taken to be only fictional or only imagined. My question is whether the criteria governing the aptness of emotions we have toward what we take to be real things apply invariantly to those emotions we have toward what we take to be only fictional or imagined. I argue that what counts as a reason justifying an emotion can differ across real, fictional, and imagined domains.