INTENTIONAL ACTION AND THE UNINTENTIONAL FALLACY
Article first published online: 2 NOV 2011
© 2011 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2011 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 92, Issue 4, pages 524–534, December 2011
How to Cite
WASSERMAN, R. (2011), INTENTIONAL ACTION AND THE UNINTENTIONAL FALLACY. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92: 524–534. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01410.x
- Issue published online: 2 NOV 2011
- Article first published online: 2 NOV 2011
Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention-based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility.