DISPOSITIONS, PRIMITIVE ACTIVITIES, AND ESSENTIALLY ACTIVE OBJECTS
Version of Record online: 4 MAR 2012
© 2012 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 93, Issue 1, pages 43–64, March 2012
How to Cite
DUMSDAY, T. (2012), DISPOSITIONS, PRIMITIVE ACTIVITIES, AND ESSENTIALLY ACTIVE OBJECTS. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93: 43–64. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01415.x
- Issue online: 4 MAR 2012
- Version of Record online: 4 MAR 2012
The question of whether there could be a physical object that is necessarily constantly active has a long history, and it has recently arisen again in the literature on dispositions. I examine and critique two proposals for affirming the possibility of such an object. I then advocate a third option, one which is workable if paired with natural-kind essentialism. Finally I briefly outline three possible implications of this view for wider debates concerning the ontology of dispositions and natural kinds.