Correction added on 23 Dec 2013, after first online publication on 4 Mar 2012. The author's first name has been changed to Rachel, at the author's request.
HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT ‘HOW DO YOU KNOW?’ CHALLENGES A SPEAKER'S KNOWLEDGE?
Version of Record online: 4 MAR 2012
© 2012 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 93, Issue 1, pages 65–83, March 2012
How to Cite
MCKINNON, R. (2012), HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT ‘HOW DO YOU KNOW?’ CHALLENGES A SPEAKER'S KNOWLEDGE?. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93: 65–83. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01416.x
- Issue online: 4 MAR 2012
- Version of Record online: 4 MAR 2012
Vol. 95, Issue 1, 140, Version of Record online: 17 FEB 2014
It is often argued that the general propriety of challenging an assertion with ‘How do you know?’ counts as evidence for the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA). Part of the argument is that this challenge seems to directly challenge whether a speaker knows what she asserts. In this article I argue for a re-interpretation of the data, the upshot of which is that we need not interpret ‘How do you know?’ as directly challenging a speaker's knowledge; instead, it's better understood as challenging a speaker's reasons. Consequently, I argue that reasons-based norms can equally well explain this data.