ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM
Version of Record online: 4 MAR 2012
© 2012 The Authors. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 93, Issue 1, pages 84–103, March 2012
How to Cite
KALLESTRUP, J. and PRITCHARD, D. (2012), ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93: 84–103. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01417.x
- Issue online: 4 MAR 2012
- Version of Record online: 4 MAR 2012
According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent's cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as agents epistemically depend on third-party members of their epistemic community as many social epistemologists contend, then there will be cases where two agents differ epistemically despite being virtue-theoretic duplicates. This means that robust virtue epistemology, at least insofar as it is understood along standard lines such that it endorses epistemic individualism, is also in tension with a central commitment of contemporary social epistemology.