THE NATURE OF RIGHTS DEBATE RESTS ON A MISTAKE
Article first published online: 4 MAR 2012
© 2012 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 93, Issue 1, pages 104–123, March 2012
How to Cite
VAN DUFFEL, S. (2012), THE NATURE OF RIGHTS DEBATE RESTS ON A MISTAKE. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93: 104–123. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01418.x
- Issue published online: 4 MAR 2012
- Article first published online: 4 MAR 2012
The recent debate over the nature of rights has been dominated by two rival theories of rights. Proponents of the Will Theory of rights hold that individual freedom, autonomy, control, or sovereignty are somehow to be fundamental to the concept of a right, while proponents of the Interest Theory argue that rights rather protect people's welfare. Participants in this debate commonly assume the existence of a single ‘concept’ of which both theories provide competing descriptions. The aim of this article is to show that both accounts are better understood as providing characterizations of different ‘kinds’ of rights.