DOES BELIEF AIM (ONLY) AT THE TRUTH?
Version of Record online: 23 MAY 2012
© 2012 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 93, Issue 2, pages 279–300, June 2012
How to Cite
WHITING, D. (2012), DOES BELIEF AIM (ONLY) AT THE TRUTH?. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93: 279–300. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01421.x
- Issue online: 27 MAY 2012
- Version of Record online: 23 MAY 2012
It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief's standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief's aim given in terms of truth, and advance a neglected alternative.