RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE ABOUT AESTHETIC VALUE
Version of Record online: 9 JUL 2012
© 2012 The Authors. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 93, Issue 3, pages 338–352, September 2012
How to Cite
WATKINS, M. and SHELLEY, J. (2012), RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE ABOUT AESTHETIC VALUE. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93: 338–352. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01429.x
- Issue online: 7 AUG 2012
- Version of Record online: 9 JUL 2012
The dominant view about the nature of aesthetic value holds it to be response-dependent. We believe that the dominance of this view owes largely to some combination of the following prevalent beliefs:
- 1The belief that challenges brought against response-dependent accounts in other areas of philosophy are less challenging when applied to response-dependent accounts of aesthetic value.
- 2The belief that aesthetic value is instrumental and that response-dependence about aesthetic value alone accommodates this purported fact.
- 3The belief that response-dependence about aesthetic value alone accommodates the widely acknowledged anthropocentricity of aesthetic value.
- 4The belief that response-dependence about aesthetic value alone accommodates aesthetic normativity.
We argue that each of these beliefs is false, and that the dominance of response-dependent accounts of aesthetic value is therefore largely without foundation.