THE ASSIMILATION ARGUMENT AND THE ROLLBACK ARGUMENT
Version of Record online: 25 JUL 2012
© 2012 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 93, Issue 3, pages 395–416, September 2012
How to Cite
FRANKLIN, C. E. (2012), THE ASSIMILATION ARGUMENT AND THE ROLLBACK ARGUMENT. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93: 395–416. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01432.x
- Issue online: 7 AUG 2012
- Version of Record online: 25 JUL 2012
Seth Shabo has presented a new argument that attempts to codify familiar worries about indeterminism, luck, and control. His ‘Assimilation Argument’ contends that libertarians cannot distinguish overtly randomized outcomes from exercises of free will. Shabo claims that the argument possesses advantages over the Mind Argument and Rollback Argument, which also purport to establish that indeterminism is incompatible with free will. I argue first that the Assimilation Argument presents no new challenges over and above those presented by the Rollback Argument, and second that the Rollback Argument itself neither presents a deep challenge to, nor raises the cost of, accepting libertarianism.