BLAMEWORTHINESS WITHOUT WRONGDOING
Version of Record online: 9 JUL 2012
© 2012 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 93, Issue 3, pages 417–437, September 2012
How to Cite
CAPES, J. A. (2012), BLAMEWORTHINESS WITHOUT WRONGDOING. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93: 417–437. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01433.x
- Issue online: 7 AUG 2012
- Version of Record online: 9 JUL 2012
In this article I argue that it is possible to be blameworthy for doing something that was not objectively morally wrong. If I am right, this would have implications for several debates at the intersection of metaphysics and moral philosophy. I also float a view about which actions can serve as legitimate bases for blame that allows for the possibility of blameworthiness without objective wrongdoing and also suggests an explanation for the appeal of the commonly held view that blameworthiness requires objective wrongdoing.