Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
Version of Record online: 10 DEC 2003
Volume 72, Issue 1, pages 257–279, January 2004
How to Cite
Bogomolnaia, A. and Moulin, H. (2004), Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences. Econometrica, 72: 257–279. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.x
- Issue online: 10 DEC 2003
- Version of Record online: 10 DEC 2003
- dichotomous preferences
We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical.
Using randomization, many efficient and fair matching methods define strategyproof revelation mechanisms. Randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants is a simple example. Equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate across all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties: the profile of probabilities is Lorenz dominant, and the revelation mechanism is groupstrategyproof for each side of the market.