The National Science Foundation and the Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Eric Battalio implemented the experimental design on the TAMU economics laboratory network.
ON THE ORIGIN OF CONVENTION: EVIDENCE FROM COORDINATION GAMES*
Article first published online: 30 JAN 2012
Royal Economic Society 1997
The Economic Journal
Volume 107, Issue 442, pages 576–596, May 1997
How to Cite
Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C. and Rankin, F. W. (1997), ON THE ORIGIN OF CONVENTION: EVIDENCE FROM COORDINATION GAMES. The Economic Journal, 107: 576–596. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00028.x
- Issue published online: 30 JAN 2012
- Article first published online: 30 JAN 2012
- Date of receipt of final typescript: July 1996
We report the results of a coordination game experiment. The experiment carefully distinguishes between conventions based on labels and conventions based on populations. Our labels treatments investigate the abstraction assumptions that underlie the concept of a strategy, while our population treatments investigate the attraction of alternative mutually consistent ways to play under adaptive behaviour. We observe conventions emerging in communities with one population and labels and with two populations and no labels, but the most effective treatment is two labelled populations. We estimate logistic response learning models for individual subject behaviour. Of the models considered, a version of exponential fictitious play fits our data best.