Thanks for helpful comments to David Baron, Dhammika Dharmapala and Jim Snyder and to participants at the Public Choice Society Conference, the Constitutional Design Conference, the Warwick/IFS Public Economics Weekend, the Research Group on Political Institutions and Economic Policy, the University of Pennsylvania, Duke University and Columbia University.
Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress*
Article first published online: 20 SEP 2008
© The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008
The Economic Journal
Volume 118, Issue 532, pages 1785–1803, October 2008
How to Cite
Knight, B. (2008), Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress. The Economic Journal, 118: 1785–1803. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02191.x
- Issue published online: 20 SEP 2008
- Article first published online: 20 SEP 2008
- Submitted: 15 November 2006 Accepted: 11 November 2007
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