We thank Marco Francesconi, Paul Gregg and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Any errors are our own.
The Effects of Work-Conditioned Transfers on Marriage and Child Well-Being: A Review†
Article first published online: 29 JAN 2009
© The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009
The Economic Journal
Volume 119, Issue 535, pages F15–F37, February 2009
How to Cite
Grogger, J. and Karoly, L. A. (2009), The Effects of Work-Conditioned Transfers on Marriage and Child Well-Being: A Review. The Economic Journal, 119: F15–F37. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02227.x
- Issue published online: 29 JAN 2009
- Article first published online: 29 JAN 2009
Transfer payments to poor families are increasingly conditioned on work. Although the effects of such programmes on employment are fairly well understood, relatively little is known about their effects on marriage or child well-being. We review a few studies that provide such information here. We sketch a theoretical model that draws from the efficient-household literature. The model is consistent with the wide range of effects that we observe and suggests an explanation for some of the observed differences. Our theoretical framework likewise explains the observed variation in the effects of such programmes on children.